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RECENT DECISIONS

1941]

a beneficiary into present vested rights. To accomplish such resultant effect, the depositor must complete "the gift in his lifetime,
either by acts sufficient to constitute a valid gift inter zdvos, or to
effect the erection of a present trust",13 thus necessitating such unambiguous conduct as plainly to imply that the depositor intended to
divest himself of his interest in the property and hold it thereafter
for the named beneficiary. The decision rests on the well-established
rule that a gift of property to take effect after the donor's death, the
donor in the meanwhile retaining control and dominion over the property, cannot be sustained since it is a testamentary disposition.' 4
The court has placed great reliance on the recent cases of In re
Vaughan's Estate 15 andMcCarthy v. Pieret,16 the latter case following the rule of Tovwmend v. Rackharn.17
M.F.

CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER

IN THE FIRST DEGREE-EVIDENCE-

TESTIMONY.-The defendants,
Strauss and Goldstein, were convicted of first degree murder under
the New York penal law.' The indictment charged that they "willfully and feloniously and of malice aforethought, killed Irving Feinstein by strangling him with a rope and setting fire to his body."
Abraham Reles, who admitted taking part in the crime, described a
sequence of events which led up to the death of the victim. The evidence showed a deliberate and premeditated plan to commit murder.
Reles admitted having committed perjury at a previous trial. Both
defendants appeal on the ground that the judge's charge to the jury
as to what was required by statute 2 as corroborative evidence of the
testimony of an accomplice, in order to convict the defendants constituted reversible error. The defendant, Strauss, further contends
that he was deprived of his constitutional rights 8 by being forced to
trial without being afforded a judicial inquiry and determination as
to his ability to comprehend the charge against him; to confer with
his counsel; and to make his defense. Held, conviction affirmed.
Although there were minor inaccuracies in the charge when it is conCORROBORATION

OF

ACCOMPLICE'S

13 WINGATE, S., in In re Vaughan's Estate, 145 Misc. 332, 260 N. Y. Supp.
197 (1932).
1 See note 6, supra.
1 145 Misc. 332, 260 N. Y. Supp. 197 (1932).
16 See note 4, supra. For a thorough discussion of this case see 53 HAv.
L. Rzv. 1060; 26 CoRN. L. Q. 130-3; 38 MIcH. L. REv. 900; 24 MINN. L. REV.
1009; 18 Ci-KENT REv. 417.
17 143 N. Y. 516, 38 N. E. 731 (1894).

1 N. Y. PENAL

LAW

§§ 1044, 1045.

2 N Y. CoDE oF Cans. PRoc. (1882)
3 U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1; N.

§ 399.
Y. CoxsT. art. I, § 6.
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sidered as a whole it was a correct statement of the law and it cannot
be said that it tended to mislead the jury. As to the second contention of the defendant, Strauss, the record shows no evidence of any
violation of his constitutional rights. People v. Goldstein, 285 N. Y.
376, 34 N. E. (2d) 362 (1941).

The test of whether one is an accomplice is whether that person
can be indicted for the same offense as the principal. 4 An accomplice
is not disqualified as a witness 5 and is competent to testify for the
prosecution. 6 A jury may reject the testimony of an accomplice who
has previously perjured himself but they are not bound to do so and
may give it such credit as they may deem it entitled to receive under
the circumstances. 7 In a criminal action the defendant may not be
convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. 8 This
corroboration must be such that it tends to connect the defendant
with the commission of the crime.9 This does not mean that the evidence must prove the whole crime. 10 However, evidence which merely
shows that the crime was committed in the fashion described by the
accomplice is not such corroboration as is required to convict 11 nor
will evidence which only establishes the credibility of the accomplice
be held sufficient. 12 In the instant case the defendant cited People v.
Malone 13 in support of their contention in regard to corroborative
evidence, in which a reversal of a conviction was obtained on a similar appeal. The judge in that case, in his instruction to the jury,
enumerated fifteen items of evidence with respect to external fact
which were in agreement with the testimony of the accomplice. Such
evidence, the court said, if believed by the jury would be corroborative evidence sufficient to convict the defendant. On appeal this evidence was found to establish only the corpus delicti and did not tend
to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. In the
instant case, however, the court was more explicit when it instructed
the jury that even if they believed the testimony of the accomplice,
they could not convict on his testimony unless it was corroborated
by "other independent and believable evidence tending to connect the
defendant with the commission of the crime." This instruction gave
4 People v. Kupperschmidt, 237

N. Y. 463, 143 N. E. 256 (1924).

5People v. Nicosia, 164 Misc. 152, 298 N. Y. Supp. 591 (1937).
6 People v. O'Neil, 48 Hun 36, 10 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1887), aff'd, People v.
O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 251, 16 N. E. 68 (1888).
7 People v. Kerr, 6 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 406, 6 N. Y. Supp. 674 (1889).
8 N. Y. CODE OF CRm. PROC. (1882) § 399. A conviction cannot be had
upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless he be corroborated by such other
evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.
9 People v. Remer, 243 App. Div. 566, 276 N. Y. Supp. 266 (2d Dep't
1935) ; see also People v. Burleson, 119 Misc. 107, 195 N. Y. Supp. 284 (1921).
10 People v. Smith, 108 Misc. 240, 177 N. Y. Supp. 519 (1919).
11 People v. Maione, 284 N. Y. 423, 31 N. E. (2d) 759 (1940).
12 People v. Kress, 284 N. Y. 452, 31 N. E. (2d) 898, rev'g, 259 App. Div.
738, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 425 (2d Dep't 1940).
'3 People v. Maione, 284 N. Y. 423, 31 N. E. (2d) 759 (1940).
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the defendants all the protection the statute was intended to provide
while in People v. Malone the instruction tended to cancel its effect.
P. D. A.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS - DECEDENT'S ESTATE - SFPARATION
AGREEMENT-GIFT INTER Vivos.-The claimant, the former wife of

the deceased, is seeking to recover from the executors money alleged
to be due her on a separation agreement between her and the deceased, which at the request of the parties had been incorporated into
the divorce decree obtained by the claimant in the New Jersey Court
of Chancery.' The agreement provided that in lieu of alimony the
husband would pay the claimant one hundred dollars per month for
the support and maintenance of their son "as long as the said son
should continue to be a student at college." At the time of the
agreement the son was about to enter a college of liberal arts. After
graduating at the end of the four-year course, he continued, with his
father's knowledge, to take post-graduate work in universities in
Europe and in the United States, up to the time of his father's death.
The deceased paid to the claimant one hundred dollars for each school
month during the first four years. The claim is for the difference
between the amount received and the amount that would be due to
her at one hundred dollars per month with interest from the time
of the commencement of the payments in June, 1930 to December,
1937, the time the deceased passed away. The surrogate denied the
claim on the ground that there had been full payment by the deceased
under the agreement incorporated in the divorce decree on the basis
that a college year does not exceed ten months, and that four such
undergraduate years were all that were contemplated. The Appellate
Division modified the decree so as to allow the claimant one hundred
dollars per month for each of twelve months for each of four years.
Held, decree as modified by the Appellate Division affirmed. In re
Kelly's Estate, 285 N. Y. 139, 32 N. E. (2d) 62 (1941).
A separation agreement which has been made part of a final
divorce decree in a foreign jurisdiction is enforceable in New York
despite the fact that it is subject to revision by the court where it was
rendered.2 The constitutional requirement 3 that full faith and credit
shall be given to judgments and decrees of other states requires, where
applicable, that such states shall give to the decree such force and
'Divorce

obtained on the grounds of desertion under New Jersey statute

(2 REV.
STAT. C. 50).
2

Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 54 Sup. Ct. 181 (1933);
Guggenheim v. Wahl, 203 N. Y. 390, 396, 397, 96 N. E. 726 (1911) ; Jones v.
Jones, 108 N. Y. 415, 15 N. E. 707 (1888).
3 U. S. CONsT. Art. IV, § 1.

